Scientific realism and the thesis of incommensurability represent two totally opposite epistemological and metaphysical positions with respect to scientific theories and theory-change. In this book, Omar Rodríguez defends the realist position using the conceptual apparatus and methodology of metatheoretical structuralism. This work represents an original contribution to the Philosophy of Science because structuralists have hardly dealt with the possible connection between scientific realism and metatheoretical structuralism to date. Advocates of incommensurability argue that, because of meaning variance of scientific terms, neither correspondence between the language of theories and empirical reality nor intertheoretical reduction is possible. When considering scientific theories as structures, Omar Rodríguez argues that the incommensurabilists’ argument against correspondence can be refuted. This is because, apart from the fact that the logical mathematical structure of theories remains the same during theory-evolution, intertheoretical approximation can be considered to be an approximation to the truth. Regarding reduction, the author maintains that intertheoretical reduction is possible, insofar as the logical structures of theories can be translated. Omar Rodríguez not only outlines a defense of scientific realism that counters the points raised in the thesis of incommensurability, but he also offers a novel alternative version of both classical scientific realism and structural realism. Any scholar looking for a completely different perspective on the topic of scientific realism should contemplate the approach presented in this book.weiterlesen