The book discusses Japan’s 1934 decision to withdraw from a naval arms control framework that had restrained military buildup on both sides of the Pacific Ocean since the early 1920s. This decision triggered an arms race with the United States, destroyed the last institutionalized structure regulating relations between the two Pacific powers and effectively started Japan’s rush to the Pacific War. Puzzling is the fact that the international environment in the Asia-Pacific was relatively stable at that time. The United States wanted to maintain constructive bilateral relations and work with Japan to prevent the regional situation from deteriorating once again following the end of the Manchurian crisis in China in 1933. Moreover, Japanese leaders were well aware that withdrawing from the naval arms control regime would trigger a destabilizing arms race with the United States and be highly damaging to Japan’s relationship with this country, the strongest naval power in the Pacific and a key trading partner. Why did the Japanese government decide to pursue unfettered naval expansion? Based on the extensive use of primary sources collected during archival research in Tokyo, the book sheds new light on the Japanese decision-making process during the interbellum, often running against previous explanations of Japan’s behavior. In addition to this detailed historical inquiry, the value of the book lies in its contributions to Neoclassical realism. Trying to combine systemic and domestic levels of analysis to understand countries’ behaviors, Neoclassical realism has been criticized for failing to provide a coherent approach, often resulting in the formulation of arguments and the incorporation of domestic variables in an manner.weiterlesen