This book repairs and revives the research program of Russell’s era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program’s agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of , it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a logic of is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in , the program’s acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular to address problems of . With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo,  became the sequel to . Chapter 2 explains Russell’s feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein’s demand that  exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4–6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about . Studies of modality and entailment are viable while  remains a above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.weiterlesen